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Threat Research Team uncovered three malicious Firefox extensions impersonating Phantom, Jupiter, and Bitget wallets to steal cryptocurrency recovery phrases and private keys.
All three contained complete stealers inside Mozilla-signed packages, placing malicious code directly in the submitted extensions.
The listings were available on Firefox Add-ons during analysis but had been removed by publication. Stolen information went to subdomains of bonto[.]io, the campaign’s shared command-and-control infrastructure.
Attackers copied wallet branding, icons, and promotional text while using Unicode homoglyphs, characters that resemble ordinary letters, to disguise extension names.
Each listing came from a separate disposable developer account, spreading the campaign across multiple publishers.
Firefox Wallets Hide Malware
The Phantom impersonator, add-on ID 3092199, combined a bundled stealer with a remote loader hidden in background/serviceWorker.js.
The loader reconstructed its server address from character codes and fetched configuration from phantom[.]bonto[.]io/config.
That configuration contained an activation flag and a base64-encoded JavaScript payload. The extension decoded the payload and executed it inside browser pages, allowing attackers to change its behavior without submitting another extension package.
It first targeted the page’s main execution environment, where it could access website objects and wallet providers. If that failed, it attempted execution in the isolated content-script environment. Cached code was injected again when tabs finished loading.
The Phantom impersonator renders as “Phantom by Phantom” with the genuine ghost icon, and its rating was inflated to 3.9 across 546 reviews at the time of writing (Source: socket)
The payload searched input fields, text areas, pasted content, and numbered recovery-phrase displays. It recognized phrases containing 12, 15, 18, or 24 words and patterns matching Ethereum and Solana private keys.
Jupiter, add-on ID 3092666, and Bitget, ID 3092059, used bundled stealers rather than remote loaders. Jupiter captured secrets during wallet imports and monitored page inputs and clipboard activity.
Bitget monitored page content, extension messages, and wallet storage as recovery phrases were decrypted. Their collection endpoints were jupiter[.]bonto[.]io and bitget[.]bonto[.]io.
Phantom’s package also contained the operator’s Node.js backend. Its code logged stolen secrets, forwarded them through Telegram, and included routines for moving funds across several blockchain networks.
A separate review server returned an inactive configuration. Comments described an “approval flip,” indicating the operator intended to enable the live payload after Mozilla’s review.
However, Socket emphasized that functional stealers already existed inside all three signed packages. Researchers also found provisioned Coinbase and Exodus subdomains under the same infrastructure, but did not locate corresponding Firefox listings.
The Phantom listing’s review count increased from 275 to 546 in roughly two days, while its average rating rose from 2.9 to 3.9. Socket identified this as rating manipulation. Reports of stolen funds in user reviews remained unverified.
Indicators of Compromise
Indicator
Type
Role / Context
bonto[.]io
Domain
Shared command-and-control and exfiltration infrastructure
phantom[.]bonto[.]io
Subdomain
Phantom payload delivery and stolen-data collection
Note:IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
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